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NOTES
Regan v. Wald: Expansion of Authority Under the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act
In a suit challenging the validity of amendments to a Treasury
Department regulation that prohibits travel to Cuba for most per-
sons,' the United States Supreme Court upheld the ban on travel in
Regan v. Wald.2 The decision expands the President's authority to
impose economic restrictions under a savings clause of the Interna-
tional Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).3 Further, Wald
1 31 C.F.R. § 515.560 (1984) was amendedto its current state in 1982 and revoked
the general license that permitted payment of travel-related expenses in Cuba. Entitled
"Certain transactions incident to travel to and within Cuba," the regulation limits payment
of "all transportation related transactions ordinarily incident to travel to and from Cuba"
and "all transactions ordinarily incident to travel within Cuba, including payment of living
expenses and the acquisition in Cuba of goods for personal consumption there" to certain
persons. Included in the group for whom travel is permitted by specific license are, among
others, government officials traveling on official business, persons traveling for the pur-
pose of gathering news or engaging in professional research, and persons traveling to visit
close relatives in Cuba.
Tourist travel or business travel not in conjunction with one of the purposes set out in
§ 515.560(a)(1)(i) is specifically not authorized in § 515.560(a)(3). Section 515.560(b)
provides that specific licenses may be granted to authorize travel in appropriate cases "for
humanitarian reasons, or for purposes of public performances, public exhibitions, or simi-
lar activities." In addition, § 515.5600) provides that "transactions involving fully spon-
sored or hosted travel to, from, and within Cuba are authorized, provided that no person
subject to U.S. jurisdiction shall make any payment or transfer of any property or provi-
sion of any service to Cuba or a Cuban national in connection with such travel."
2 104 S. Ct. 3026 (1984).
3 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (1982). The savings provisions of the IEEPA are con-
tained in § 1706(a):
(a) Termination of national emergencies pursuant to National Emergencies
Act
(1) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, notwithstanding
the termination pursuant to the National Emergencies Act [50 U.S.C.
§ § 1601-1651 (1981)] of a national emergency declared for purposes of this
chapter, any authorities granted by this chapter, which are exercised on the
date of such termination on the basis of such national emergency to prohibit
transactions involving property in which a foreign country or national
thereof has any interest, may continue to be so exercised to prohibit transac-
tions involving that property if the President determines that the continua-
tion of such prohibition with respect to that property is necessary on account
of claims involving such country or its nationals.
(2) Notwithstanding the termination of the authorities described in sec-
tion 101 (b) of this Act, any such authorities, which are exercised with respect
to a country on the date of such termination to prohibit transactions involv-
ing any property in which such country or any national thereof has any inter-
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eliminates the need for the President to follow the IEEPA consulta-
tive procedures4 in imposing new restrictions toward a country if
some authority was exercised under section 5 of the Trading With
the Enemy Act (TWEA)5 toward that country at the time the IEEPA
was enacted. Finding sufficient foreign policy considerations to jus-
tify such restrictions with respect to Cuba,6 the Court ruled that
Wald's constitutional right to travel was not violated. The Court
broadly interpreted the scope of the savings clause, which
grandfathered in authority exercised under section 5 of the TWEA.
It further noted that it would continue its traditional deference to the
executive branch in such matters. 7
Wanting to travel to Cuba, plaintiff Wald sought an injunction
to prevent enforcement of the amended regulation in the District
Court for the District of Massachusetts.8 Concluding that Wald had
not shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, the court
denied the preliminary injunction.9
On appeal, Wald argued that the amendment of the TWEA in
1977, which effectively limited the President's power to impose eco-
nomic sanctions subsequent to a declaration of national emergency,
est, may continue to be exercised to prohibit transactions involving that
property if the President determines that the continuation of such prohibi-
tion with respect to that property is necessary on account of claims involving
such country or its nationals.
Id.
4 50 U.S.C. § 1703 (1982). The consultative procedures of the IEEPA provide for a
greater role by Congress once the President has declared a national emergency. The pro-
vision includes:
(a) Consultation with Congress
The President, in every possible instance, shall consult with the Con-
gress before exercising any of the authorities granted by this chapter and
shall consult regularly with the Congress so long as such authorities are
exercised.
(b) Report to Congress upon exercise of Presidential authorities
Whenever the President exercises any of the authorities granted by this
chapter, he shall immediately transmit to the Congress a report specifying-
(c) Periodic follow-up reports
At least once during each succeeding six-month period after transmit-
ting a report pursuant to subsection (b) of this section with respect to an
exercise of authorities under this chapter, the President shall report to the
Congress with respect to the actions taken, since the last such report, in the
exercise of such authorities, and with respect to any changes which have oc-
curred concerning any information previously furnished pursuant to
paragraphs (1) through (5) of subsection (b) of this section.
(d) Supplemental requirements
The requirements of this section are supplemental to those contained in
title IV of the National Emergencies Act [50 U.S.C.A. § 1641].
Id.
5 Ch. 106, 40 Stat. 411 (1917) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-44
(1982)).
6 Wald, 104 S. Ct. at 3039.
7 Id.
8 Id. at 3029-30.
9 Id. at 3030.
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and the simultaneous enactment of the IEEPA require that the Presi-
dent follow the consultative procedures set out by IEEPA before
travel restrictions could be effective.' 0 Furthermore, Wald asserted
that the savings clause of the IEEPA, which grandfathered in section
5 restrictions in force at the time of its enactment, was ineffective to
grandfather the travel restrictions, because no travel restrictions had
been in effect when the savings clause was enacted.II Finally, Wald
argued that even if the restrictions were found to have been effected
properly, they violated his constitutional right to travel. 12
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Vacated the district
court order and remanded with instructions to issue the preliminary
injunction.'i The court ruled that the Government was required to
follow the consultative procedures of the IEEPA in setting forth the
travel restrictions, and therefore, the amendments to the Treasury
Department regulation were invalid for lack of statutory authority.14
The Government filed a petition for rehearing and asked for an
additional stay of mandate of thirty days in the event the rehearing
was denied to decide whether to seek certiorari. 15 In its petition for
rehearing the Government argued that it was exercising its authority
to restrict travel when the savings clause became effective. It stated
that the general license that allowed transactions incident to travel
to, from, and within Cuba did not negate the effectiveness of the
general prohibition against all transactions with Cuba that had been
in effect since 1963.16
10 Id. at 3032. Both the Government and Wald agree that the consultative proce-
dures were not followed when 31 C.F.R. § 515.560 was amended in 1982. The Govern-
ment, however, maintains that it was not required to follow the IEEPA consultative
procedures and relies on the grandfather clause of § 1703 for statutory authority for the
amendment.
I I Id. at 3032. The Government argues that, while specific restrictions on travel were
not in effect at the time the grandfather clause was enacted, the "authority" to impose
such restrictions was being exercised. It maintains that this authority was sufficient to
grandfather in the amended travel restrictions.
12 Id. at 3032. As the Supreme Court noted, the lower court did not reach this consti-
tutional issue, because it held the regulation invalid for lack of statutory authority. Wald v.
Regan, 708 F.2d 794, 795 (1st Cir. 1983) (en banc), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 3026 (1984). The
appellate court acknowledged a constitutional protection of the right to travel in its Memo-
randum and Order in response to the Government's petition for a stay of mandate. 708
F.2d at 803. The Supreme Court, however, was the first court to address the issue on the
facts of this case. 104 S. Ct. at 3038-39.
13 708 F.2d at 795.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 802-03.
16 Id. at 802. The Government initially argued that it was restricting travel at the time
of the amendment because of a prohibition on all transactions with Cuba. See 31 C.F.R.
§ 515.201 (1984). A general license, Regulation 560, which was in effect in 1982, was
enacted subsequent to § 515.201 and excepted travel from the total prohibition. It was
first passed on March 21, 1977. Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 42 Fed. Reg. 16,621
(1977). It was amended on May 12, 1977 to further relax restrictions on travel-related
1985]
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The First Circuit denied the petition for rehearing, 17 finding
that travel was not restricted on the effective date of the savings
clause. The court examined the substance-whether travel in fact
was restricted on July 1, 1977-rather than the form of the restric-
tions.' 8 Thus, the savings clause was not a sufficient statutory basis
for the restrictions. The court also denied the petition for a stay of
mandate,' 9 stating that while foreign policy considerations weigh in
favor of a stay,20 the protected right to travel weighs against such a
stay.2' The court also noted that the Supreme Court had instructed
courts to "construe narrowly all delegated powers that curtail or di-
lute" the right to travel. 22
The Supreme Court granted the Government's request for a
stay of mandate23 and soon after granted the petition for certiorari.24
Reversing the appellate court, the Supreme Court ruled for the Gov-
ernment in a five to four decision.25 The Court found that the "au-
thority" to regulate property transactions with Cuba was being
exercised on July 1, 1977, the effective date of the savings clause.26
transactions with Cuba. Transactions Incidental to Authorized Travel to Cuba, 42 Fed.
Reg. 25,499 (1977).
The Government later argued that it was restricting Cuban travel because travelers
could bring only $100.00 worth of goods for personal use back to the United States, only
nonscheduled flights were allowed, and domestic credit card issuers were restricted from
contracting with Cuban enterprises. The court, however, rejected this argument, stating
that the impact of these restrictions on travel was too minimal to cause it to alter its opin-
ion. Wald, 708 F.2d at 802.
17 Wald, 708 F.2d at 802. The court also had noted that it was appropriate to discuss
the Government's requests and the court's reasoning in detail because the Government
had stated that the decision would have significant implications for foreign policy. The
court then discussed the petition for rehearing and the petition for a stay of mandate sepa-
rately in the Memorandum and Order. Id. at 802-04.
18 Id. at 802-03.
19 Id. at 802. The court also noted that if the thirty-day stay were granted, it would
continue until final disposition by the Supreme Court if the Government filed a petition
for certiorari, thus preventing Wald from traveling to Cuba during that time. FED. R. App.
P. 4 1(b).
20 The right to travel has not been held to be absolute. "[T]he fact that a liberty
cannot be inhibited without due process of law does not mean that it can under no circum-
stances be inhibited." Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 14 (1965) (footnote omitted). The Secre-
tary of State's refusal to validate passports of U.S. citizens for travel to Cuba has been
upheld "because of foreign policy considerations affecting all citizens." Id. at 13.
21 Wald, 708 F.2d at 803. "Freedom of travel is a constitutional liberty closely related
to rights of free speech and association." Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 517
(1964). "The right to travel is a part of the 'liberty' of which the citizen cannot be de-
prived without due process of law under the Fifth Amendment." Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S.
116, 125 (1958).
22 Kent, 357 U.S. at 129. "If that 'liberty' is to be regulated, it must be pursuant to the
law-making functions of the Congress." Id.
23 Regan v. Wald, 103 S. Ct. 3567 (1983).
24 Regan v. Wald, 104 S. Ct. 479 (1983).
25 Wald, 104 S. Ct. at 3039-40. The majority opinion was written by Justice Rehn-
quist. A dissenting opinion written by Justice Blackmun was joined by Justices Brennan,
Marshall, and Powell. An additional dissenting opinion was written by Justice Powell.
26 Id. at 3035.
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The Court held that this was sufficient to bring newly imposed travel
restrictions under the savings clause, even if the specific travel re-
strictions had not been in effect at the time of its enactment. 27
The Court reasoned that travel-related transactions, such as
payment for meals, lodging, and transportation within Cuba, are
transactions with respect to property in which Cuba or Cubans have
an interest.28 These transactions fall within the statutory language of
the TWEA, because the President is authorized to regulate "any"
transaction involving "any" property in which a foreign country or
national has "any" interest. 29
The Court failed to find any indication in the legislative history
that Congress intended to freeze existing restrictions when it
amended the TWEA and enacted the IEEPA.30 The Court ruled that
because a broad prohibition on transactions with Cuba existed under
the Cuban Assets Control Regulations when the savings clause was
enacted on July 1, 1977, specific restrictions added after that date
would be valid even if the consultative procedures set out in the
IEEPA were not used.31
The Court found support for the decision in the general license
that had allowed travel, but expressly was subject to revocation,
amendment, or modification "at any time." 32 According to the
Court, the travel-related transactions "were specifically made
subordinate to further actions which the President might take," ' ss
and automatically became subject to the Cuban Assets Control Reg-
ulations when no longer specifically authorized.3 4
Upholding the travel restrictions, the Court ruled that they did
not violate Wald's right to travel guaranteed by the due process
clause of the fifth amendment of the Constitution. 5 The Court
27 Id.
28 Id. at 3034. "For purposes of TWEA, it is clear that the authority to regulate
travel-related transactions is merely part of the President's general authority to regulate
property transactions." Id. (footnote omitted).
29 See 31 C.F.R. § 515.201(b). Any emergency declaration can be used by the Presi-
dent in conjunction with § 5(b) of the TWEA to regulate economic transactions, and the
regulations need not be specifically related to the emergency declaration under which they
are imposed. Prior to passage of the National Emergencies Act of 1976, four national
emergencies were in effect: President Roosevelt's 1933 declaration regarding the banking
crisis, President Truman's 1950 declaration regarding the Korean War, President Nixon's
1970 declaration regarding the post office strike, and Presidient Nixon's declaration re-
garding the 1971 balance of payments crisis.
30 Wald, 104 S. Ct. at 3025. The Court emphasizes that if Congress had wanted to
freeze the existing restrictions, it could have done so explicitly.
31 Id. at 3035.
32 31 C.F.R. § 515.805 (1984). See supra notes 1 & 16.
33 Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 673 (1981).
34 Wald, 104 S. Ct. at 3035. The Court noted that the source of all restrictions on
property transactions relating to Cuba is Regulation 201(b), which is part of the Cuban
Assets Controls Regulations.
35 Id. at 3039-40. A protected right to travel was first recognized in Kent v. Dulles, 357
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stated that there is a strong foreign policy justification for restricting
travel to Cuba that is sufficient to restrict the fifth amendment right
to travel.3 6 The Court indicated that it would continue to defer to
the political branches of the Government with regard to foreign pol-
icy issues rather than perform any independent foreign policy analy-
sis of its own, and that matters relating "to the conduct of foreign
relations. . . are so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of
government as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or
interference. ' 3 7
Congress had given the President broad authority to restrict
economic transactions with foreign nations during times of war and
times of "national emergency" without congressional approval in
section 5 of the TWEA.38 Enacted originally in 1917, six months
after the United States entered World War I, the TWEA was
amended to its current state in 1977.3 9 Congress narrowed the Pres-
ident's authority to act without congressional consultation at that
time40 and provided separate means for presidential imposition of
economic restrictions pursuant to national emergencies. 4'
Section 5 of the TWEA now allows the President to exercise au-
U.S. 116 (1958), in which the Court held that the freedom to travel "is, indeed, an impor-
tant aspect of the citizen's 'liberty."' Id. at 127. See supra notes 20-22.
Referring to its prior decisions regarding freedom of travel, the Court noted that
"[r]espondents' counsel undoubtedly speaks with some authority as to these cases, since
he represented the would-be travelers in most of them." Wald, 104 S. Ct. at 3038.
36 Wald, 104 S. Ct. at 3038-39. The Court stated that the restrictions in Zemel and in
this case "are justified by weighty concerns of foreign policy." Id. at 3039. The foreign
policy justification is to limit Cuba's access to hard currency, which could be used "in
support of Cuban adventurism." Id.
37 Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 589 (1952).
38 The President has delegated his authority under § 5(b) of the TWEA to the Treas-
ury Secretary. Exec. Order No. 9193, 3 C.F.R. 1174, 1175 (1938-43 comp.), reprinted in 50
U.S.C.A. app. § 5 (West Supp. 1984).
39 Prior to the 1977 amendment § 5(b)(l) provided in part:
During time of war or during any other period of national emergency
declared by the President, the President may, through any agency that he
may designate, or otherwise, and under such rules and regulations as he may
prescribe, by means of instructions, licenses, or otherwise ....
50 U.S.C.A. app. § 5(b)(l) (West Supp. 1984).
40 In its amended form § 5(b)(1) applies only to time of war. It now reads:
During the time of war, the President may, through any agency that he
may designate, and under such rules and regulations as he may prescribe, by
means of instructions, licenses, or otherwise ....
Id.
41 50 U.S.C. § 1701, entitled "Unusual and extraordinary threat; declaration of na-
tional emergency; exercise of Presidential authorities" provides:
(a) Any authority granted to the President by section 1702 of this title
may be exercised to deal with any unusual and extraordinary threat, which
has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the
national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States, if the Pres-
ident declares a national emergency with respect to such threat.
(b) The authorities granted to the President by section 1702 of this title
may only be exercised to deal with an unusual and extraordinary threat with
respect to which a national emergency has been declared for purposes of this
chapter and may not be exercised for any other purpose. Any exercise of
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thorities granted under the TWEA during times of war, while section
1701 of the IEEPA, which also was enacted in 1977, sets out the re-
quirements for the imposition of restrictions during "unusual and
extraordinary threats" that are declared to be national emergen-
cies.42 The President's power over substantive areas is slightly nar-
rower under the IEEPA than under the original TWEA, 43 and the
IEEPA requires that the President follow consultative procedures
when declaring national emergencies. 44
The President must now report to Congress "in every possible
instance" before exercising any authorities granted by the IEEPA.45
If the President neglects to consult Congress before exercising any
of the authorities, "he shall immediately transmit to the Congress a
report" concerning such exercise. 46 In addition, once the initial con-
sultation has been made, whether before or after the President exer-
cises the authorities, periodic follow-up reports must be given to
Congress at least once during each subsequent six-month period.47
When Congress amended the TWEA to narrow the President's
authority to declare national emergencies, it included a grandfather
clause in the IEEPA.48 This provided that the authorities conferred
upon the President by section 5(b) of the TWEA that were being
exercised with respect to a country onJuly 1, 1977 could continue to
be exercised by the President under the savings clause of the IEEPA
without the need for additional action. 49 The consultative proce-
dures set out in the IEEPA need not be followed in those instances.
The Cuban Assets Control Regulations were imposed in 1963
under the authority held by the President under the TWEA. 50 These
regulations constituted a broad embargo on Cuba and were "origi-
nally adopted to deal with the peacetime emergency created by Cu-
such authorities to deal with any new threat shall be based on a new declara-
tion of national emergency which must be with respect to such threat.
42 See supra notes 40-41.
43 Unlike under the TWEA, in a declared emergency under the IEEPA the President
may not exercise the powers to take title to foreign property, to regulate purely domestic
transactions, to regulate gold or bullion, or to seize records. See H.R. REP. No. 459, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 14-15 (1977) [hereinafter cited as HousE REPORT].
44 50 U.S.C. § 1703. See supra note 4 for the text of the provision.
45 50 U.S.C. § 1703(a).
46 Id. § 1703(b).
47 Id. § 1703(c).
48 Id. § 1706(a). See supra note 3 for the text of the provision.
49 50 U.S.C. § 1706(a).
50 31 C.F.R. § 515 (1984). See Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 28 Fed. Reg. 6974
(1963) (filed July 8, 1963). Alternative statutory authority for the Cuban Assets Control
Regulations may be found in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-195, 75
Stat. 424. See 28 Fed. Reg. 6974 (1963). 22 U.S.C. § 2370(a)(1) (1982) provides:
No assistance shall be furnished under this chapter to the present govern-
ment of Cuba. As an additional means of implementing and carrying into
effect the policy of the preceding sentence, the President is authorized to
establish and maintain a total embargo upon all trade between the United
States and Cuba.
1985]
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ban attempts to destabilize governments throughout Latin
America." 5'
Regulation 560 was added to the Cuban Assets Control Regula-
tions in 1977 and contained a general license that permitted pay-
ment of travel-related expenses in Cuba by persons visiting that
country.52 Payment of such travel-related expenses had been pro-
hibited previously under the embargo established by the Cuban As-
sets Control Regulations.5 3 In 1982 Regulation 560 was amended to
its current state of prohibiting payment of expenses incident to
travel to Cuba to "reduce Cuba's hard currency earnings from travel
by U.S. persons to and within Cuba."' 54 The TWEA amendments
and the IEEPA had already taken effect when Regulation 560 was
amended in 1982, and the consultative procedures of the IEEPA had
not been followed in setting out this regulation.
Travel restrictions historically have been viewed differently from
other commercial regulations. 55 Although the right to travel is not
absolute, the Court has recognized it as a right that is guaranteed by
the due process clause of the fifth amendment. 56 Limitations on this
right can be justified if foreign policy considerations support such
51 Wald, 104 S. Ct. at 3030. The President had authority at that time under § 5 of the
TWEA to impose broad embargoes on foreign countries in time of war or during any
other period of national emergency. Similar embargoes are in effect against North Korea,
North Vietnam, Cambodia, and South Vietnam. See 31 C.F.R. § 500.201 (1984).
52 Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 42 Fed. Reg. 16,621 (1977). Regulation 560
was passed on March 21, 1977 and was amended on May 12, 1977 to further liberalize
travel-related transactions with Cuba. Transactions Incidental to Authorized Travel to
Cuba, 42 Fed. Reg. 25,499 (1977).
53 31 C.F.R. § 515.
54 Id. Section 515.560 was amended on April 19, 1982, Cuban Assets Control Regu-
lations: Travel Related Transactions, 47 Fed. Reg. 17,030 (1982), and again on July 21,
1982, 47 Fed. Reg. 32,060 (1982). The 1982 amendments were noted to be "an important
part of this Government's policy of tightening the current trade and financial embargo
against Cuba." Crossette, US. Linking Cuba to 'Violence'Blocks Tourist and Business Trips, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 20, 1982, at AI, col. 4.
55 See supra notes 22, 36, 37. See Benjamin & Treloar, Area Restrictions and the Right to
Travel Abroad, 8 U.C.D. L. REV. 401 (1975); Velvel, Geographical Restrictions on Travel: The
Real World and the First Amendment, 15 U. KAN. L. REV. 35 (1966); Rauh & Pollitt, Restrictions
on the Right to Travel, 13 W. REs. L. REV. 128 (1961); Comment, The Right to Travel and
Passport Revocation: Haig v. Agee, 8 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 391 (1982); Comment, Judicial
Review of the Right to Travel: A Proposal, 42 WASH. L. REV. 873 (1967); Note, Constitutional
Protection of Foreign Travel, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 902 (1981); Note, The Right to Travel Abroad,
42 FORDHAM L. REV. 838 (1974); Note, Constitutional Law: Resolving Conflict Between the Right
to Travel and Implementation of Foreign Policy, 1966 DUKE L.J. 233; Note, Travel and the First
Amendment: Zemel v. Rusk, 13 UCLA L. REV. 470 (1966); Note, Constitutional Law: Right to
Travel Versus Power to Conduct Foreign Affairs: Area Restrictions on Passports: Zemel v. Rusk, 50
CORNELL L. Q 262 (1965); Recent Development, Regulation Prohibiting Transactions Incident
to Travel to, from, or Within Cuba Held Constitutional. U.S. v. Fernandez-Pertierra, 17 TEx.
INT'L LJ. 529 (1982).
56 The Court first recognized such a right in 1958. Kent, 357 U.S. at 125. See supra
note 21 and accompanying text. Distinction has since been drawn between a freedom to
travel outside the United States and a right to travel within the United States. Haig v.
Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 306 (1981); Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170, 176-77 (1978).
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restrictions, 5 7 and the Court will defer to the political branches in
deciding what constitutes a significant matter of foreign policy. 58
The Wald decision allows the President to impose additional
economic restrictions with regard to a country, without following the
IEEPA consultative procedures, as long as some TWEA restrictions
were in effect at the time the IEEPA grandfather clause was enacted.
Thus, Wald broadens the scope of the President's authority in such
situations.
Although Wald does not affect the validity of the IEEPA provi-
sions when applied to countries that did not have TWEA restrictions
in force against them onJuly 1, 1977, it does allow the President to
continue to act under the sole authority of the TWEA with regard to
some countries. This gives the President greater power to impose
additional restrictions at will with regard to those countries. The
President does not have to consult with Congress on those restric-
tions or make periodic reports as required under the IEEPA, because
these procedures were not required under the TWEA.
In rejecting the court of appeals reasoning, which was based on
the use of specific language, legislative history, and underlying pur-
pose of the TWEA, the Court failed to consider seriously these fac-
tors. The dissent criticized: "[t]o achieve its labored result, the
Court invokes a series of platitudes on statutory interpretation, but
ignores their application to this case." 59
The Court found that the use of "authorities" instead of the
more narrow term "restrictions" in the language of the grandfather
clause indicated the need for a broad interpretation. In so doing, the
Court overemphasized the importance of the use of "authorities" in
the provision. The following dialogue between Congressman Cava-
naugh and Mr. Bergsten of the Treasury Department, the Carter Ad-
ministration's principal spokesman for the amendments, shows the
Committee's principal concerns and indicates how the executive in-
terpreted the clause:
MR. CAVANAUGH .... First of all, Mr. Bergsten, would it be your
understanding that [the savings clause] would strictly limit and re-
strict the grandfathering of powers currently being exercised under
5(b) [of the TWEA] to those specific uses of the authorities granted
in 5(b) being employed as of June 1, 1977.
MR. BERGSTEN. Yes, sir.
57 On occasion, the Court has found foreign policy justifications sufficient to over-
come the fifth amendment right to travel. See, e.g., Zemel, 381 U.S. I (Secretary of State
could refuse to validate passports for travel to Cuba where a general ban on such travel
was in effect).
58 The Court noted that its earlier holding in Zemel "was not tied to the Court's in-
dependent foreign policy analysis." Wald, 104 S. Ct. at 3039. Matters relating "to the
conduct of foreign relations . . . are so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of
governments as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference." Harisiades,
342 U.S. at 589 (footnote omitted).
59 Wald, 104 S. Ct. at 3045.
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MR. CAVANAUGH. And it would preclude the expansion by the
President of the authorities that might be included in 5(b) but are
not being employed as of June 1, 1977.
MR. BERGSTEN. That is right.
60
It was the understanding of both the Committee and the execu-
tive that only those restrictions existing on July 1, 1977 would fall
within the scope of the grandfather clause. The discussions were not
focused on the "authorities," but rather, on the "specific uses of the
authorities"-the specific restrictions in effect at that time. There-
fore, the use of the word "authorities" in the clause should not be
controlling, as the Court has so interpreted.
The Wald Court did not give sufficient weight to the legislative
history, which shows a congressional intent to narrow the scope of
the President's authority to impose TWEA restrictions. 61 Address-
ing the legislative history, the Court stated: "Oral testimony of wit-
nesses and individual Congressmen, unless very precisely directed to
the intended meaning of particular words in a statute, can seldom be
expected to be as precise as the enacted language itself."6 2 While
this may be true, Justice Blackmun, who found sufficient evidence of
congressional intent to narrow the President's authority in the legis-
lative history, noted in his dissent that "[t]he Court rejects this nar-
row interpretation in favor of one that loses all sight of the general
legislative purpose of the IEEPA and the clear legislative intent be-
hind the grandfather clause." '63
60 Revision of Trading with the Enemy Act. Markup Before the House Comm. on International
Relations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1977) [hereinafter cited as House Markup].
61 See generally Emergency Controls on International Economic Transactions: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on International Economic Policy and Trade of the House Comm. on International Rela-
tions, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1977) [hereinafter Subcomm. Hearings].
The Senate Report on Public Law 95-223 stated that the purpose of the Bill was "to
revise and delimit the President's authority to regulate international economic transac-
tions during wars or national emergencies." S. REP. No. 466, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 2,
reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4540, 4541 [hereinafter cited as SENATE
REPORT]. See Note, The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: A Congressional Attempt to
Control Presidential Emergency Power, 96 HAtuv. L. REV. 1102 (1983) (IEEPA was a result of
Congress' efforts to limit presidential power and reclaim supposedly usurped authority).
62 Wald, 104 S. Ct. at 3036.
63 Id. at 3045. The Senate thought the bill was necessary to address two situations:
extensive presidential use of emergency authority under § 5(b) of the TWEA to regulate
economic transactions unrelated to declared national emergencies; and passage of the Na-
tional Emergencies Act of 1977, which provided congressional safeguards in declaring and
terminating national emergencies; but which exempted § 5(b) of the TWEA. SENATE RE-
PORT, supra note 61, at 2, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 4541.
The House shared this view, stating:
[S]ection 5(b) has become essentially an unlimited grant of authority for the
President to exercise, at his discretion, broad powers in both the domestic
and international economic arena, without congressional review. These
powers may be exercised so long as there is an unterminated declaration of
national emergency on the books, whether or not the situation with respect
to which the emergency was declared bears any relationship to the situation
with respect to which the President is using the authorities.
HousE REPORT, supra note 43, at 7.
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When the TWEA amendments and the IEEPA were being dis-
cussed in the House subcommittee, some members wanted to re-
strict as much as possible the President's authority to impose
restrictions pursuant to a national emergency. 64 They felt that a
grandfather clause was not desirable and that the existing regula-
tions should be allowed to expire. The subcommittee heard testi-
mony, however, that such a clause was needed to protect the
President's negotiating position with other countries.65 Such a
clause would prevent the President from having to declare or reas-
sert a national emergency with regard to certain countries to con-
tinue existing restrictions, which would require a political act with
international political impact.
The subcommittee deleted one clause from the IEEPA grandfa-
ther clause because the members believed that the clause would not
adequately narrow the President's authority and could give him au-
thority not already exercised under section 5.66 When the full House
committee discussed the grandfather clause after this deletion, the
scope of the clause was debated. 67 The Committee was concerned
that the President not have the authority to impose additional re-
strictions under the savings clause. 68 There would have been no
64 See, e.g., Subcomm Hearings, supra note 61, at 167-69, 198 (remarks of Rep. Cava-
naugh); id. at 210 (remarks of Rep. Findley).
65 See, e.g., id. at 19 (statement of Prof. Lowenfeld); id. at 103, 113, 119 (statements of
Assistant Treasury Secretary Bergsten); id at 209-10 (remarks of Mr. Santos, Treasury
Department attorney adviser).
66 An early form of the grandfather clause considered by the subcommittee contained
two subparts:
(1) any authority conferred upon the President by section 5(b) of the Trad-
ing with the Enemy Act, which is being exercised with respect to a set of
circumstances on the date of the enactment of this Act as a result of a na-
tional emergency declared by the President before such date of enactment,
may continue to be exercised with respect to such set of circumstances; and
(2) any other authority conferred upon the President by that section may be
exercised to deal with the same set of circumstances.
Subcommittee Staff Director R. Roger Majak explained the purposes of subsection (2)
in the following manner:
With respect to any uses of 5(b) authorities for any presently existing
situation, not only could the President use those particular authorities that he
is now using, but any others which are conferred by section 5(b). So if the
President is presently using asset controls toward a particular country, but is
not using, let us say, currency controls, he nonetheless could use, at some
later date if he so desired, currency controls with respect to the situation.
I think it boils down to a question of whether we are grandfathering a
particular situation, and all the powers that may be necessary to deal with the
situation, or whether we are grandfathering the particular authorities them-
selves in their usage.
Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 61, at 167.
67 House Markup, supra note 60, at 21.
68 Id. It is also important to note that Congress was not persuaded that an emergency
situation toward Cuba existed. See HousE REPORT, supra note 43, at 10 (grandfathering
"existing uses of these powers, without either endorsing or disclaiming" them is in line
with committee's purpose); id at 11 (few current uses could be justified as responding to
existing emergencies); id (emergencies are by nature rare and brief; not normal, ongoing
problems); Subcomm Hearings, supra note 61, at 110 (threat of communist competition in
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need for this concern if the President already had the authority to
impose additional restrictions where any authority was being exer-
cised at that time.
According to the Wald Court, the prime purpose of the grandfa-
ther clause was to keep the bill that contained it from becoming too
controversial and bogging down in partisan disputes. 69 In support
of this view, the Court cited the House Report, which discusses the
need to grandfather "existing uses" of the powers and to assure im-
proved future uses. 70 As the dissent noted, these statements are
supportive of a narrow interpretation of the grandfather clause even
if its purpose was to avoid partisan dispute. 7'
The need for a grandfather clause to protect the President's ne-
gotiating position with other countries is an important consideration,
but is of little if any significance with regard to the reimposition of
Cuban travel restrictions. Because a new public statement had to be
made when the general license was amended to restrict travel in
1982, the President's acting in accordance with the consultative pro-
cedures would not have created additional problems or tensions in
Cuban or other foreign relations. 72 Thus, the purposes of the
grandfather clause would not have been violated if the President had
followed the consultative and reporting procedures.
Wald effectively defeats congressional intent to narrow the Presi-
dent's authority to impose additional restrictions. Where the IEEPA
provisions apply, the declaration of national emergencies is likely to
occur less frequently and with greater consensus in Congress of the
need for such a declaration. In addition, the continuation of such a
declaration can be monitored more closely because the President is
required to report to Congress regarding the situation at least once
every six months. This requirement would prevent a declaration of
national emergency from remaining in effect longer than necessary,
and reevaluation of the declaration of a national emergency would
occur regularly.
When the President imposes restrictions under the TWEA, it is
a more serious matter for Congress to consider whether the restric-
the world is not an emergency unless one considers it a permanent emergency); id. at 198
(President can propose to Congress that emergencies "do not exist and cannot be justi-
fied" but should be allowed to continue); id. at 210 (reference to the "phony character" of
the emergency regarding Cuba).
69 Wald, 104 S. Ct. at 3037. See Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 61, at 198-200. "This is
essentially an act trying to clear up the mess that the Trading With the Enemy Act has left
us in. We can always move on the front of Vietnam or Cuba. . . . However, to get this
through in reasonably good form, we would like not to raise that particular controversy."
Id. at 210.
70 Wald, 104 S. Ct. at 3037. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 43, at 9-10.
71 Wald, 104 S. Ct. at 3047 ("the passage provides strong support for exactly the
interpretation that the Court rejects").




tions are justified than if the restrictions are imposed under the
IEEPA. Because no consultative or reporting procedures are re-
quired by the TWEA, congressional debate on the restrictions neces-
sarily would indicate some dissatisfaction with the President's
actions. This could cause or increase tensions with the affected
country or with other countries that have some interest in the
situation.
The Wald Court's deference to the executive in its broad inter-
pretation of the grandfather clause is unwarranted. Interpretation of
the TWEA and the IEEPA necessarily involve issues of foreign pol-
icy, but foreign policy inherently is involved in any trade or other
economic relationship with a foreign country or foreign national.
While the effect of the travel restrictions is desirable to limit Cuba's
ability to acquire hard currency, the manner in which such restric-
tions were achieved is not desirable. As Justice Powell noted in his
dissent, the Court's role is "limited, however, to ascertaining and
sustaining the intent of Congress. It is the responsibility of the Presi-
dent and Congress to determine the course of the nation's foreign
affairs." 73 By disregarding the clear intent of Congress and ex-
panding the President's authority in this instance, the Court acted
outside its limited role. The Court first determined the result it de-
sired and then formulated the justification for that result, effectively
becoming an active participant in determining the course of foreign
policy.
The legislative history clearly shows that Congress intended to
limit the President's assertion of restrictions to those in effect at the
time of the enactment of the grandfather clause. Wald unfortunately
encourages inconsistency in United States economic relations with
other countries by allowing the President to exercise authority that
Congress did not intend to grant to the President.
The Court's ruling on the constitutionality of the travel restric-
tions, however, is sound if it is assumed that the President had acted
within his authority in imposing the restrictions. 74 If the IEEPA can
be used to impose additional restrictions pursuant to a declared na-
tional emergency, foreign policy considerations should be great
enough to justify a constitutional prohibition on travel.
-JANE E. GWINER
73 Wald, 104 S. Ct. at 3049.
74 See supra notes 20-22, 35, 36.
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